The recent passing of the iconic Vietnam-era Defense Secretary Robert McNamara brought to mind an article I read by Tom Davenport in a Harvard Business Publishing blog about analytics in the combat theater in Afghanistan.
Mr. Davenport summarizes an approach called "Combat Analytics" that is being used to assess progress toward the American military's objectives in Afghanistan, and how difficult it is to identify metrics about counterinsurgency activities that are directly reflective of the situation on the ground. It's a fascinating summary of the issue, and it focused on the frequent disconnect between broad measures (e.g., at a national level) and the very specific things commanders need to measure "how the civilian population is faring at a local level."
I'll leave aside the obvious enterprise vs department vs individual metrics corporate analogy for now, and state for the record my surprise at the degree to which the architect of these combat analytics uses "economic and political/social indicators to see if [the commanders'] strategy is working in their regions." A fascinating read, and a great reminder of how valuable meaningful metrics, presented well, can be life-changing (or life-saving).
Lagniappe: An interesting supplemental report on the topic, "The Uncertain Metrics of Afghanistan (and Iraq)" can be found here.
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